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CASE NOTE
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-Snail Darters-A Threat to Private Use of the Public
Domain? Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 98 Sup. Ct. 2299 (1978).

Last summer the U.S. Supreme Court decided to strictly
construe the provisions of the Endangered Species Act of
1973, (ESA),I thereby protecting a species of Tennessee fish
from extinction by completion of a dam constructed by the
Tennessee Valley Authority. The evolution of the litigation
and the expansive language of the opinion suggest extensive
application of the decision and the ESA. This note discusses
the shadow cast by this decision over the already complicated maze of regulation governing private use of the
public domain.
Congress originally authorized the Tennessee Valley
Authority (hereinafter TVA) to construct the Tellico Dam
and Reservoir Project in 1966.2 Tellico is a multipurpose
regional development project designed to stimulate
shoreline development, produce electricity, provide flood
control and generally encourage economic growth in a traditionally underdeveloped region of Tennessee.' From its inception, the project encountered extended public opposition
in the political and legal arenas.4 Two significant events
resulting in the eventual demise of the project occurred in
1973 after 35 million dollars had been expended on the project.5 In August, 1973, Dr. David Eitnier discovered a new
variety of perch popularly known as the snail darter. Four
months later Congress passed the Endangered Species Act
of 1973. The 1973 ESA was the sweeping culmination of a
legislative process inaugurated by the passage of the Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966.6
In January, 1975, opponents of the dam petitioned the
Secretary of the Interior to add the snail darter to the Endangered Species List. In November, 1975, over TVA's objections, the snail darter was designated as an endangered
Copyright©1979 by the University of Wyoming.
1. 16 U.S.C.A. 1531 et seq. (Supp. IV 1974).
2. Hill v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 549 F.2d 1063, 1067 (6th Cir. 1977).
3. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 98 Sup.Ct. 2279 (1978).
4. Brief for the Respondents at 6; TVA v. Hill, supra note 3. Litigation included
challenges under NEPA, EDF v. TVA, 339 F.Supp. 806 (E.D.Tenn. 1972), aff'd 468
F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972).
Tellico ProOFFICE REPORT EMD - 77058, The TVA
5.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING
ject-Costs, Alternatives and Benefits October 14, 1977, quoted in Brief for

6.

Respondents at 13, TVA v. Hill, supra note 4.
16 U.S.C. §§ 668aa-668cc-b (1970) as amended by Pub. L. No. 91-135 § 12(e) (1969).
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species primarily because of the threat posed by the Tellico
project.' In the original complaint, filed in 1976, Plaintiffs
sought to enjoin further construction of the Tellico Project
under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act.' The relevant portion of Section 7 requires that all federal agencies
utilize their authority in furtherance of the ESA "by taking
such action necessary to insure that actions authorized,
funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence of such endangered species and threatened
species" or destroy the habitat of such species. The District
Court specifically found that the snail darter and its habitat
had been properly designated by the Secretary of the Interior and that the Tellico project would probably destroy
the species and its habitat.' However, the District Court
spurned the plaintiff's request for an injunction on the
grounds that Congress could not have intended that a court
halt impoundment of water behind a fully completed dam if
an endangered species were to be found on the day the gates
were scheduled to close."i The District Court considered
TVA's contention that Congressional Appropriations for the
Tellico project constituted repeal by implication of any portions of the ESA inconsistent with completion thereof, but
chose not to embrace it. The decision appears to rest on the
district court's view that an injunction would be unreasonable.
In a "decision that may have taken many observers by
surprise"," the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 2
The Appeals Court concurred in the lower court finding that
the effect of the Tellico project was to destroy the snail
darter. However, the Court quickly dismissed TVA's
7.
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.

Hill v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 419 F.Supp. 753, 757 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
Though it was not apparent at the time of passage, Section 7 is the pivotal portion of
the Act.
The Secretary shall review other programs administered by him and utilize such programs in furtherance of the purposes of this [Act] by carrying out programs for the
conservation of endangered species and threatened species listed pursuant to [Section 4 of this Act] and by taking such action necessary to insure that actions
authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence
of such endangered species and threatened species or result in the destruction or
modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary, after
consultation as appropriate with the affected States, to be critical. 16 U.S.C.A. Section 1536.
Hill v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 419 F.Supp. 753, 756. 757 CE.D. Tenn. 1976).
Id. at 873.
Supreme Court Protects Snail Darter from TVA: Congress Poised to Weaken Endangered Species Act. 8 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW RE oicr-iii 10154. 10156, August,
1978.
Hill v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977).
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arguments based on legislative history and implied repeal by
subsequent appropriations. It found "the meaning and spirit
of the Act... clear.'1 3 The Appeals Court declined to find injunctive relief unreasonable. According to the Court, the
Legislative and Executive branches were the proper places
for weighing the reasonableness of alternatives.1
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and the
majority opinion by Chief Justice Burger purported to focus
on two narrow questions: (a) whether continued congressional appropriation constituted implied repeal of ESA as
applied to Tellico and (b) whether the 1973 ESA required a
court to enjoin operation of a virtually completed project
authorized prior to 1973."1 Apparently disregarding this narrow statement of the issues, the court proceeded to address
the broader application of the ESA and the division of
responsibilities among the branches of government. The
court found "nothing in the appropriations measures to support the implied repeal.' 1 6 Speaking for the majority, Chief
Justice Burger reviewed the legislative history of Section 7
and stated that, "One would be hard pressed to find a
statutory provision whose terms were plainer.' 1 7 Congress
did not intend to grandfather projects already authorized
and the "very words affirmatively command all federal agencies."" 8 The statute is to be strictly interpreted and it is not
for the court to question "the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course selected by the Congress."' 9
Justice Powell's dissent, in which he was joined by
Justice Blackman charged that the majority's reading of
Section 7 was "an extreme example of a literalist" approach,
completely disregarding common sense and the public
weal."0 Nonetheless, the majority retained the view that
manifest congressional intent did not recognize judicial
balancing. Furthermore, the balance could never favor project continuance over loss of a single subspecies because the
Congress meant to halt such extinctions, whatever the
cost.2
13. Id. at 1072.
14. Id at 1071.
15. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, supra note 3, at 2283.
16. Id at 2293.
17. Id. at 2291.
18. Id. at 2291.
19. Id.
20. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, supra note 3, at 2297.
21. Id. at 2295.
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WARNING OR A TREND

One commentator has suggested that the opinion has
"overtones of ridicule." 22 The almost sarcastic emphasis on
literal interpretation and deference to Congress is seen as a
"red flag" warning that Congress should modify its approach to Endangered Species legislation and, by implication, other environmental legislation.2 3 Such analysis is
predicated on the illusory assumption that this case is an
'exception', somehow inconsistent with earlier decisions.
Only two cases are cited by the court in the lengthy
discussion of the ESA2 4 and neither reference appears essential to the Court's final position. However, the most carefully
reasoned prior case applying Section 7 of the Endangered
Species Act recognized the mandatory obligation of federal
agencies to insure that their actions do not harm endangered
species or their habitat.25 An amicus curiae brief submitted
on behalf of several national environmental groups 26 relies on
a diverse set of cases to support the view that Congress
reserved to itself the right to balance the various factors
determining the fate of an endangered or threatened specie.
Justice Powell's dissent attempts to disregard these cases
by embracing TVA's reliance on an 1892 case 8 which suggested that courts could not give statutes meanings which
made it appear that the legislature intended an absurd
result. 29 More persuasive than any single case, is the recognition that the current trend of the federal courts including the
Supreme Court, is to defer to the Congress (or its delegated
agency) to make the complex value judgments inherent in
environmental questions. Previous opinions are replete with
22. Kerschten, Acting on EndangeredSpecies, Vol. 10, No. 29 NATIONAL JOURNAL, 1176.
23. Chief Justice Burger's opinion attempts to distinguish this case from previous National Environmental Policy Act cases on ground that the statutes serve different
purposes and that NEPA contains moderating language such as "weigh", "consider" and "significant". TVA v. Hill, supra note 3, 4682, N. 12.
24. Id. at 4681; Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, (1949). Id. at 4682, National Railroad
25.

Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453
(1974).

National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 373 15th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied sub nom. Boteler v. National Wildlife Federation, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
26. Brief Amicus Curiae of Environmental Defense Fund, National Audubon Society,
National Wildlife Federation, National Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club and
Defenders of Wildlife, TVA v. Hill, 46 L.W. 4673, 57 L.Ed.2d 117, 98 S.Ct. 1067
27.
28.
29.

(June 15, 1978).
Id. at 8, 9. Cases cited include Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1957), Gregg v.
Leargia, 428 U.S. 153 (1975), Peters v. Habby, 349 U.S. 331, Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1976).
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
TVA v. Hill, supra note 3, at 2302.
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references to the Congressional policy setting role and
deference to the informed discretion of administrative agencies.30 While the fact situation in TVA v. Hill and the archly
worded majority opinion have caught the popular imagination, the position of the Court was foreseeable and consistent
with earlier decisions.
ESA

AND PUBLIC LAND STATES

The Court's opinion makes it quite clear that the provisions of Section 7 apply to all federal actions. In public land
states, such as Wyoming, nearly all major resource allocation decisions will be affected. Federal agencies control
forty-seven percent (47%) of Wyoming's surface area and
eighty-three percent (83%) of the State's subsurface. Federal
decisions, from coal leasing to grazing permits, directly impact Wyoming citizens. Unfortunately, the number of endangered and threatened species as well as the extent of
their critical habitats is largely unknown.' Major inventories and surveys will have to be conducted before the
necessary information will be partially available. Research in
this area will continue ad infinitum because the ESA reflects
a greatly expanded federal commitment to the preservation
of endangered species. 2 All members of the plant and animal
kingdoms are included.33 Similarly, the species need not be
threatened with worldwide extinction, it need only be
threatened or endangered within "any significant portion of
its range."3 4 There are over two million full species of
animals and plants in the world. More than two hundred
thousand of those may need to be listed as endangered or
threatened. Furthermore, an additional fifteen to twenty
thousand species are discovered each year. 5 These figures
30. See, Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 426 (1976) (air pollution); DuPont de
-_ (February 23, 1977) (water pollution), Kleppe v.
Nemours v. Train,
- U.S.
Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) (environmental impact statement process).
31. Interview with Don Dexter, Assistant Director Operations, Wyoming Game and
Fish Commission, August 26, 1978.
32.

For further discussion see: Mallory, Obligations of FederalAgencies Under Section
7 of the EndangeredSpecies Act of 1973, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1241.

33.
34.
35.

16 U.S.C.A. Section 1532(5)(9).
16 U.S.C.A. Section 15324).
species of animals and 600,000 full species
"There are approximately 1.4 million full
of plants in the world. Various authorities calculate as many as 10% of them-some
200,000-may need to be listed as endangered or threatened. When one counts
subspecies, not to mention individual populations, the total could increase to three
to five times that number." TVA v. Hill, 46 U.S.L.W. 4673, 4675 at N. 8. "An additional 15,000 to 20,000 species are discovered each year." 21 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 729 (14th Ed. 1972).
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multiply several times when subspecies are included as required by the ESA.", A subspecies may be a localized population so that a development may threaten a subspecies while
not threatening the species as a whole.37 The practical
significance of this distinction was illustrated in National
Wildlife Federation v. Coleman.3" In that case the recent
discovery that the Mississippi and Florida sandhill cranes
are distinct subspecies ultimately led to the re-routing of an
interstate highway.
Serious problems develop when federal agencies pursuing their primary missions take actions which contravene
the purposes and directives of the ESA.3 9 The frequency and
severity of the problems will depend on the interpretation of
the phrase "actions authorized, funded or carried out by"
federal agencies, and the determination of the threshold impact that an agency action must have on an endangered
species to trigger the application of the ESA.
The absence of qualifying language in the 1973 ESA is
in sharp contrast to previous legislation in this area. 40 After
reviewing the legislative history, the Supreme Court made it
clear that the provisions of Section 7 applied to all federal actions.
One would be hard pressed to find a statutory proviIt's very
sion where terms were any plainer ....
words affirmatively command all federal agencies
'to insure that actions authorized,funded, or carried
out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence of an endangered species or result in the
destruction or modification of habitat of such
admits of no exceptions.
species .... ' This language
41
(Emphasis the Court's)
36.
37.
38.
39.

40.

41.

16 U.S.C.A. Section 1532 (12) (Supp. IV 1974).
For an informative discussion of specie-subspecie distinctions see G. STEBBINS,
PROCESSES OF ORGANIc EVOLUTION. (2d Ed. 1971) PP. 88-90.
National Wildlife v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 362 N. 3 (5th Cir. 1976).
"It is further declared to be the policy of Congress that all federal departments and
agencies shall seek to conserve endangered species and threatened species and shall
utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter." 16 U.S.C.A.
1531(c). See also, Note 8, supra.

Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, §§ 1-5. 12, 83
Stat. 275, amending Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-669, §§ 1-3, 80 Stat. 926, repealed, Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. No. 93-205,
§§ 14, 87 (Stat. 903, 1973). This act was repealed by ESA of 1973.
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, supra note 3, at 2291.
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Application of the ESA presents very different problems than the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
Extensive litigation of NEPA has produced a workable standard that requires federal agencies to "consider ecological
factors when dealing with activities which may have an impact on man's environment."42 The environmental impact
statement procedure only insures that such consideration
take place.4" Under ESA, an agency must not only insure
consideration of endangered species but the agency bears
the burden of insuring that its action does not jeopardize the
species or its habitat. This fact, combined with the liberal
ESA provisions for citizen suits 44 will no doubt lead to litiga-

tion by environmental or citizen groups seeking to halt
development requiring federal action.45
The ESA speaks only of federal agency actions but a
state agency acting in cooperation with a federal agency is
subject to an injunction issued against the federal agency.
This is true even if the state agency is not alleged to have
violated Section 7.46 Thus, any action taken by Wyoming

state agencies, such as the Highway Department, in conjunction with federal programs would appear to be covered
by the provisions of ESA. Analyzing the implications of Section 7 becomes increasingly difficult when private actions
authorized by a federal agency such as the mining of federal
coal or the use of public lands for grazing are considered. Section 7 on its face would appear to cover these actions. The
facts of this case did not force the court to specifically determine the issue.
The concept of a "major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" has been extensively considered by the courts in the NEPA context.4 7 In
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, the Supreme Court suggested that
42.
43.

44.
45.

46.
47.

Zabel v. Tobb, 430 F.2d 199, 211 (5th Cir. 1970).
The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act contains mandatory language more closely
paralleling Section 7. 16 U.S.C.S. 662. Violations of this Section have prompted
courts to grant redress through injunctive relief. Akers v. Resor, 339 F.Supp. 1375
W.D. Tenn. 1972).
16 U.S.C.A. Section 1540.
In a case currently pending in the U.S. District Court of Nebraska, the NWF relies
in part on Section 7 violations in requesting an injunction halting all further work on
the Missouri River Basin Power Project located in Wheatland. Wyoming. Plaintiffs
Brief at 14, State of Nebraska, et aL, v. National Rural Electrification Administration, et aL Docket No. CV 76-L-242 (D. Neb. July, 1978).
National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman. 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1976).
Phrase is found in § 102(2)(c) of National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42
U.S.C. § 1332(2)(c).
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federal actions included steps "to issue a lease, approve a
mining plan, issue a right of way permit, or take other action
to allow private activity.""8 If the Court is willing to include
these items within the definitions of major federal action
under NEPA, it is reasonable to conclude that the same type
of actions would be included under ESA, particularly since
the application of Section 7 is not limited to "major" federal
actions.
The majority's harsh treatment of Justice Powell's
dissenting opinion49 suggests that not only are such
authorizations covered but that the private party may be in
continuing jeopardy of losing the authorization. For example, a company obtaining a five (5) year permit to mine coal
on public lands pursuant to the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 197750 would necessarily be subject to
the provisions of Section 7 when the permit is granted or
renewed. However, the Secretary of Interior may also be
obligated to order cessation of operations, 5 ' if an endangered
or threatened species which had been properly designated at
the time of the original action was subsequently identified
within the permit area, without regard to the existing permit.
Indeed a District Court decision issued subsequent to
Hill, suggests that the provisions of Section 7 apply to
federal actions even if the habitat or species is designated
after the federal permit or authorization is granted. In State
of Nebraska v. National Rural Electrification Administrations, the court discussed a Section 404 permit granted by
the Corps of Engineers prior to the designation of a
downstream area as a critical habitat.
"The fact that a stretch that may be affected
by the Project was not declared a critical habitat until after issuance of the permit does not alter the
duties of the Corps as to chat habitat. Colonel Ray
is not faulted for not treating the area as critical
habitat before it was so declared; it is simply that he
must now treat it as such in accordance with the
Act." 2
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 399-400 11976).
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, supra note 3, at 2287.
Public Law 95-87, 30 U.S.c. 1201 et seq.
30 U.S.C. 1271.
State of Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Administration, No. 78-L-90 (D. Neb.,
Oct. 2. 1978.
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An actual example of the impacts of ESA is the Department of Interior's decision to employ the presence (or possible presence) of an endangered species (or critical habitat) as
one of the criteria for making an administrative determination to designate certain federal lands as unsuitable for min53
ing.
Preliminary data prepared by the Department of Interior suggests that 1 % of the federal coal in Wyoming may
not be available for mining due to the presence of the
blackfooted ferret. In Utah the percentage of coal affected
may be as high as 29%."'
Neither the courts nor the administrative agencies have
determined the exact level of involvement an agency action
must have with an endangered species or critical habitat to
trigger the provisions of Section 7. One author has analogized E SA to NEPA and concluded that the threshold should
be extremely low.5" This would be consistent with National
Wildlife v. Coleman5" where the court stated that Section 7
applies when any agency action "may affect" an endangered
species or critical habitat.
In determining whether an action exceeds the threshold,
it is necessary to decide what impacts will be included. An
opinion issued by the Solicitor's Office, Department of Interior, states that: "In our view, Section 7 and the
Secretary's regulations require the consideration of not only
the impacts of the particular project subject to consultation,
but also the cumulative effects of other activities or programs which may have similar impact." 7 Similarly, the 5th
Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the Federal Highway
Administration was in error for not considering the impact
of potential private residential and commercial
developments associated with the construction of a
highway."
53,
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Inter-Agency Task Force, "Issue Papers: Intra-regional Matters Affecting Designs
of A Leasing Program" Department of Interior, July, 1978.
See, The Preliminary Draft E.I.S. for the Federal Coal Management Program, Sept.
29, 1978, Department of Interior P. 1-45- See also, 43 Federal Register 41828.
Obligations of Federal Agencies under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of
1973, supra note 33, at 1269.
National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, supra note 26, at 371.
Solicitor's Opinion M-36-905, quoted in Plaintiff's Brief at 22, State of Nebraska v.
N.R.E.A., supra note 45, at 22.
National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, supra note 26.
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Congress and the Courts have placed the major responsibility for compliance with ESA on the federal agencies.
This results in substantial agency discretion. The American
Bald Eagle, for instance, is protected as an endangered
specie. In evaluating a specific tract of land for mining the
Bureau of Land Management must first determine whether
an eagle habitat (a nest) is present. If so, then they must
determine the size of the necessary buffer zone between the
habitat and any resource development. The buffer zone may
range from one quarter to ten miles depending on the agency's evaluation of all factors involved. 9 This decision
significantly affects mining plans and coal leases because a
typical seam 70 feet thick can produce over a million tons of
coal for each 8.7 acres of land disturbed. 0
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION: THE STANDARD OF SCRUTINY

A party aggrieved by an administrative decision under
the ESA may not find a sympathetic ear in the courts. In
April, 1978, the Supreme Court issued an opinion that appears to restrict the ability of the courts to control the administrative conduct of federal agencies." The Court held
that proper procedural review of agency actions (except in
extraordinary cases) extended only to insuring that agencies
adhered to the minimum procedural requirements contained
in Section 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).6 2 In
deciding Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, the Court reversed "a highly
regarded tradition in the courts of appeals, particularly the
D.C. Circuit, of requiring administrative agencies to
establish hearing procedures more elaborate than otherwise
required under Section 553 where necessary in the interest of
fairness to the parties."6 3 The Court also admonished the
59.

Interview with Bob Brown, Deputy Director for Planning, Bureau of Land Management, Wyoming, September 10, 1978.

60.

WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT,
MENT ALTERNATIVES, (1974).

61.

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 46
U.S.L.W. 4301 8 ELR 20288, 20297 (April 3, 1978). The opinion reviews the decisions in Natural Resources Defense Council v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 6 ELR 20614 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (remanding operating license
issued to Vermont Yankee Corp.) and Aeschliman v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 622, 6 ELR 20599 (D.C. Cir. 19761 (remanding construction permit issued to Consumers Power Corp.).
5 U.S.C. § 553.
Vermont Yankee: Supreme Court Sets New Limits on JudicialReview of Agency
Rule Making, 8 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 10103, 10107 (1977).

62.
63.
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lower court not to "impose its own notion" of proper procedures on agencies entrusted with substantive functions by
the Congress. 4
Endangered species cases in the Sixth and Eighth Circuits 65 applied the standard of review established in Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe (U.S. 1971). 66 Namely
that the agency decision was to be overturned only "if it was
arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law" and/or it "was outside its scope
of authority." 7 The two circuits arrived at different results
but the Sixth Circuit's view would appear to be sounder
authority since it was affirmed by the Supreme Court in
TVA v. Hill.6 The Sixth Circuit found TVA's decision to
finish the Tellico project to be in direct violation of Section 7
and 'not in accordance with the law'. The Court discussed
the role of the Secretary of Interior in insuring that the actions of federal agencies were in compliance with ESA. According to the court, compliance standards formulated by
the Secretary "may properly influence final judicial review."
The Court saw "positive benefit to be gained by impressing
his criteria with a judicial imprimatur."" Increased judicial
deference to administrative decision-making in the environmental area combined with the Secretary of Interior's
role-under ESA may make it extremely difficult to challenge
agency determinations in this area.
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE

Severe public and political reaction to the Supreme
Court's decision was to be expected.7" Numerous amendments to the ESA were immediately introduced in both
houses of Congress. On October 15, 1978, the Congress
established a cabinet-level committee with power to grant
exemptions from the Act. The committee would be composed of the Secretaries of Agriculture, the Army, and the
Interior, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors,
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, supra
note 57, at 27.
Hill v. TVA, supra note 2, Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976).
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
Id- at 413-414.
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, supra note 3.
Hill v. Tennessee Valley Authority, supra note 2, at 1070.
8 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 10154, 10157.
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the Administrators of the Environmental Protection Agency
and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
and the governor of the state which is affected by the action
for which the exemption is sought. Five members of the committee would have to agree for an exemption to be granted.
The committee can exempt a project only if four conditions
are met:
"(A) there are not reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency action; and
(B) the benefits of such action clearly outweigh the
benefits of alternative courses of action consistent
with conserving the species or its critical habitat,
and such action is in the public interest; and
(C) the action is of regional or national significance;
and
(D) it establishes such reasonable mitigation and
enhancement measures, including, but not limited
to, live propagation, transplantation, and habitat
acquisition and improvement, as are necessary and
appropriate to minimize the adverse effects of the
agency action upon the endangered species,
threatened species, or critical habitat concerned."
The supercommittee option was selected after the Congress rejected a proposal that projects seeking an exemption
be considered on individual basis by the whole Congress. An
attempt to exempt nearly all projects was also rejected. The
practical effect of the Congressional amendments appears to
be minor. The process remains largely the same except that a
final administrative appeal may be made to the special committee. Conditions which must, be met before a project can be
exempted combined with the committee membership will
make exemptions difficult to obtain. The sheer cost of pursuing the appeal process will probably prohibit individual
operators or ranchers from seeking relief through this committee.
CONCLUSIONS

The Endangered Species Act of 1973 on its face imposes
mandatory restraints on actions by federal agencies. The
Supreme Court decision to strictly apply the ESA leaves lithttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol14/iss1/3
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tle doubt that actions authorizing private use of the public
domain are included. Pursuant to Section 7 of the ESA,
federal agencies must insure that authorized actions do not
adversely effect endangered species or their habitats. Good
faith adherence to ESA will be difficult because little is actually known about the number of endangered species or the
extent of their habitats.
Private individuals in the Western States need permits
to use the public domain for activities ranging from coal mining to cattle grazing. These individuals now face an added
element of uncertainty. This uncertainty is created not only
by the ESA, but also by the current judicial standards
employed to review actions by administrative agencies.
Under current standards, it appears that administrative
agencies will be free to exercise their discretion with minimal
interference from the courts. Similarly the Congress has indicated that it will not interfere in the operation of the ESA.
Final assessment of the ESA's impact on the private
use of the public domain must be deferred until the federal
agencies decide how vigorously to enforce its provisions. If
federal land managers decide to zealously apply Section 7, it
is likely that elected officials from public land states will be
forced to support efforts to substantially undermine the
strict provisions of the ESA.
DAVID
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